The official Indycar report on Dan Wheldon’s death was released today.  The conclusions:  Wheldon died when his head/helmet hit a fencepost, but it took a combination of factors to bring about this awful tragedy.  They also noted that it wouldn’t have made any difference if the fenceposts were on the inside of the fence or the outside of the fence.  I pretty much said the same thing in my analysis of the incident.  Indycar, much to their credit, has released the entire 49 page report to the public, which comes to you here via pressdog.

The obvious question is “what do we do now”?

When I last spoke with Dean Sicking (the inventor of the SAFER barrier), I asked him who the primary groups were in the world who are doing motorsports safety research in the area of track barriers and fences.  There are a few, but most of them focus on human mechanics or medicine.  If you want to be specific, there is exactly one group in the country doing intensive research into motorsports track safety and that’s at the University of Nebraska.  Yes, I know that some sanctioning bodies have their own R&D divisions; however, they have limited staff and they also have the responsibility for doing things like certifying new products for use in their series.

Most research at Universities is funded by grants (usually from federal or state agencies, sometimes from private foundations) or contracts (usually from private industry and designed to accomplish a very specific objective, with deliverables.)

One of the primary issues with the catchfence is the vertical poles that support the wire mesh.  Initial reports argued that, if the poles had been outside the mesh, there wouldn’t have been a fatal accident.  This is not right.  Inside or outside, hitting one at high speed is going to be fatal.  I suggested before that a possible solution would be to somehow cantilever the fence so that the posts would be a few feet away from the mesh.  You’d need quite the system of wires, but I know it’s possible.

Let’s give Sicking and his group a grant to design a better catchfence.

Do you have  any idea how much money you would need to test such a catchfence?  When designing the SAFER barriers, Sicking told me that getting a driverless car to hit the barrier at a precise speed and angle was actually the most technically challenging part of the research.  Now we not only have to have a high-speed racecar hit the new catchfence, but we also have to have it in the air when it does so.

I suggest that the industry needs a Center for Motorsports Safety Research.  It would be a non-profit center operating independently of any sanctioning body, but it would work with the sanctioning bodies to prioritize research needs.   Representatives from the various sanctioning bodies, along with motorsports researchers, would form an advisory board that would try to anticipate safety issues, as opposed to how we deal with them now, which is reactively.

I think it’s important that this be an independent body and not beholden to NASCAR or IndyCar.  There would be a small research staff, with room for visiting researchers who can contribute particular specialization to specific problems.  I would (of course) put Dean Sicking in charge of it because he is one of the best engineers and most honorable persons I have even known.  He’s shown his ability to design for two very different cars at the same track already.   I’d also charge them with preparing educational materials for drivers at all levels to make them aware of state-of-the-art safety concerns and the equipment they need to be as safe as possible.

Who should fund this center?  The sanctioning bodies, the media who make money from broadcasting motorsports, the track owners, and you and me:  the race fans.

From Jayski’s track seating and attendance page, 3.6 million people attended NASCAR races last year.  Let’s add a safety surcharge of $2.00 per ticket is added on — and frankly, if you begrudge paying less than the cost of a beer to facilitate your part of this research, you shouldn’t call yourself a race fan.  That would be $7.2 million dollars right there for motorsports safety research.  Add on contributions from the media partners who broadcast motorsports, the occasional generous driver, and you have the start of a center.

As I said in my previous article, motorsports will never be entirely safe.   But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do everything we can to try to ensure that we never lose another driver again.

Kudos, Indycar for your transparency and commitment to learn as much as you can from this tragedy.

 

 

“This is a huge tragedy for IndyCar but I hope that out of this tragedy comes some good in terms of improving more in safety, like when Greg Moore died and Dale Earnhardt, and now Dan Wheldon. The innovations that come out from that in terms of improving driver safety need to be kicked up another notch. We hope that is what will happen.” –Paul Tracy

I’m a relatively new Indycar follower.  Part of dealing with a series of health crises over the last 18 months was getting rid of electronic baggage: relentlessly negative people, and those who confuse ‘snarky’ with cruel. That left some holes in motorsports content that were happily filled by new friends from the open-wheel world like PopOffValve, OilPressure and SpinDoctor500blog. They introduced me to a new world and a new group of drivers. I immediately picked out Dan Wheldon for his wit, his smile and his ability to communicate what so effectively during his Versus appearances. Over the last couple weeks, I’ve read many words of grief, tribute and, more recently, of thoughts about what happens next.

As a reminder, this blog focuses on analyzing and understanding the science and engineering of racing. Opinions are welcome, but they have to be substantiated by fact and stated respectfully. No ad hominem attacks.

A Brief History of Barriers

The original purpose of barriers around tracks was keeping cars separated from spectators.  In addition to concrete walls to prevent the cars from driving off track, debris-spewing accidents necessitated fencing to contain airborne objects.  Most fencing was standard-issue chain-link, which is cheap, plentiful, easy to put up and surprisingly strong.

Solving one problem (as so often happens) generated another:  while very effective at keeping spectators safe, drivers could be (and were) seriously injured hitting these rudimentary structures.  The problem became worse as speeds rose – the kinetic energy of an object increases with the square of its speed.  This means a car going 180 mph has nine times more kinetic energy than the same car going 60 mph.  When a car comes to a stop, all of its kinetic energy has to be dissipated – transformed into heat via skidding or friction between the brake rotors and the brake pads, for example.  The longer the car takes to come to a stop, the less force experienced by the driver.

Concrete walls are simply too unyielding.  Springy walls might seem like the answer, but bouncing a car back into the paths of other cars creates other problems.  The SAFER (Steel And Foam Energy Reducing) barriers were a huge technical advance because they dissipated the car’s energy via flexing hollow steel square tubing and smushing foam between the tubing and the concrete wall. The SAFER barriers have been one of the most visible technical achievements associated with motorsports.

Chain-link fabric

Photo from: http://www.chainlinkfence-yihang.com/Engineering-Drawings.html

Catchfences pose a slightly different set of problems.  They should have the same properties as the walls, but they can’t block the view.   In addition to sight, one of the best parts of seeing a race in person is the sound and – if you’re close enough – feeling the wind generated by the cars zooming by. Chain link fence is a good compromise between visibility and protection.

Chain-link fabric is like an elastic metal mesh. It can give in two ways: gentle forces cause the mesh to deform.  The diamonds stretch out of shape, but when the force is removed, the fabric springs back to its original shape. The fence can also deform by stretching the wires that make up the mesh. A large-enough force will break the wire, leaving a hole in the fabric.

How much the mesh can stretch depends on how it is supported.  If the frame is too big – meaning that there’s a very large area of mesh between supports — the mesh will stretch too much. Vertical poles are used periodically to provide additional strength.  How the poles are attached to the mesh is critical, because the attachments allow the load to be shared between the fabric and the poles.  The larger the forces, the more robust the links between the poles and the mesh must be.

Photo from: http://jonesinforspeed.blogspot.com/2008_07_01_archive.html

Race track fencing is stouter in just about every way.  The mesh is made of larger-gauge wire with higher tensile strength.  The links between the poles and the fabric are stronger:  In the picture at right, steel cables run horizontally through the mesh and are fixed to the vertical poles using some massive turnbuckle-like fixtures.

Different tracks have different installations.  Some have metal tubing running horizontally as reinforcement.  One of the pictures below has larger-holed mesh that is attacked to the poles at every possible point.

The SAFER barrier represented a paradigm shift in barriers:  a entirely different principle of operation.  Catchfence improvements have primarily been via stronger mesh, stronger or a greater number of poles, or better links between the poles and the mesh.  But it’s basically the same fundamental design.

The chain-link fence has been institutionalized in motorsports, with governing bodies developing specific standards for debris fencing.  These standard tests allow us to compare different types and installations of fences.  In the FIA test, a 760-kg  (1675 lb) test mass is shot into a fence at a speed of 65 km/h (40 mph) at heights of 1.6 m and 2.5 m (5.25 and 8.2 feet respectively).  While 40 mph seems very slow, they’re taking just about the entire mass of an Indy car and concentrating it in a relatively small sphere.  A real car would impact over a much larger area and spread out the force.

Photo from http://www.geobrugg.com/contento/security/English/Home/Debrisfences/CrashTests/tabid/3874/language/en-US/Default.aspx

The photo at left shows the fence working perfectly in terms of what’s being tested:   The mesh deforms (a lot!) without breaking.  Load is transferred to the poles, with the poles nearest the impact bending.  The emphasis, however, is pretty strictly on containment.

With that background, let’s examine some of the theories that have been advanced and see how the science stacks up.

The “It’s Obvious What Went Wrong” Theory

I got a chuckle out of Dean Sicking, inventor of the SAFER barriers and Director of the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility, when I started our conversation by asking him how many people contacted him after the crash and asked him to make a definitive conclusion about the cause of the crash solely the basis of the television video.

Motorsports accidents rarely have a single cause. It is almost always a confluence of events that add up to disaster. Even Sicking, with many years of experience, can’t look at a videotape and positively identify a cause.   A formal investigation is in progress.  Sicking (who is not part of that investigation) noted that the investigators will use every bit of data they have access to:  accelerometers in the cars that measure the forces the cars experience and earpiece accelerometers (which all Indycar drivers wear) that provide data about the forces the driver feels (because the two forces are rarely identical).  They will have that information from every driver and car on the track.  The team will investigate all of the safety apparel (HANS, firesuits, helments, etc.), in-car video, photos, broadcast video and all of the information from race control.   This is a very complicated situation given the number of cars involved and it’s going to take some time to unwind.

The one think Sicking is willing to say definitively is that “It’s too soon to blame the fence”.  He has some ideas on how the current catchfence design could be improved – but he politely declined to share those given that he hasn’t had an opportunity to test any of them yet.

The “Inside-Outside” Theory

Photo from: http://markjrebilas.com/blog/?p=6338. Check his website - there are some really great pictures.

A popular theory making the rounds is that the fence at Las Vegas Motor Speedway is unsafe because the vertical support poles are on the inside of the fencing (facing the track).  The support poles in the picture at left are on the outside (facing away from the track).  In a coincidence perfect for the black helicopter crowd, SMI tracks (like Las Vegas) have the vertical supports inside the fencing, while ISC tracks have supports outside the fencing.  Sicking doesn’t think the location of the poles inside vs. outside makes a significant difference.  A number of people have advanced the theory that the poles on the inside ‘shred’ the car and that moving them to the outside of the wire mesh would provide a much smoother surface.

I think the picture they have in their minds is of a car traveling along parallel to the fence and hitting the posts as it goes by.  If that were the case, then it would be true that having the posts on the outside would be better; however, it’s highly unlikely a car would travel that way.

Most crashes don’t happen parallel to the fence – the car hits with some component of velocity perpendicular to the fence, which makes avoiding hitting a pole virtually impossible given the spacing between the poles.

Sicking says the problem is not whether the poles are inside or outside the mesh, but that they are so close that it is almost impossible for a flying car to hit the fence without hitting one (or more) poles.

The “Close the Cockpit” Theory

It is hard to find any evidence countering the assertion that an open-wheel driver is much more susceptible to injury from a cockpit-first barrier or catchfence hit than a stock car driver.  Indy cars have a roll hoop, but it’s a fairly minimal structure and, if compromised, leaves nothing to protect the driver’s head.   If you want evidence in support of closed cockpits, consider the two extremely violent crashes experienced by Audi LMP (closed-cockpit) cars at this year’s 24 Hours of LeMans.  Both drivers walked away.

While acknowledging that open-cockpit cars are an integral part of Indycar tradition, I don’t think you can escape the conclusion that maintaining that tradition increases the risk to the drivers.  Whether that’s an acceptable risk or not, it seems to me, is up to the drivers.

The “Hockey Rink” Theory

Hockey rinks use a clear wall to protect fans from flying hockey pucks (and sometimes from players being slammed against the boards).  The Lexan polycarbonate is strong enough to withstand the force of the hockey puck and still allows clear sight lines for the fans.  Lexan is used for bullet-proof windows and similar demanding applications. Lexan is also used (and recently mis-used) in the windshields of NASCAR stockcars.

When thinking about forces, the mass of the object, its speed and the time of the hit (how long the two objects are in contact) are important.  The record speed for a hockey puck (which weighs about 5.5-6 oz.) is about 106 mph.  Race cars, on the other hand, weigh a whole lot more (1600 and 3250 lbs in round numbers for Indycars and stock cars) and travel even faster.  I’ve compared on the plot below the kinetic energies (KEs) of a NASCAR stock car, an Indy open-wheel car and a hockey puck.  Some values are shown in the table for comparison:

Comparing the kinetic energy of a hockey puck with race cars.

Object Mass (kg) Weight (lb) Speed (m/s) Speed (mph) Kinetic Energy (J)
Hockey Puck 0.17  0.375 47.4 106 191
IndyCar Car 710 1560 98.4 220 3,433,733
NASCAR Stock Car 1477 3250 80.5  180 4,782,648

(The hockey puck is that flat purple line on the graph.)

Even if we consider that the time of the hit for the hockey puck could be, say, 100 times shorter than that for the cars, we’re still talking about factors of hundreds or more in terms of the force the wall would have to sustain.  Lexan is simply not up to the job.  You could try a composite – a combination of two materials that produces properties superior to either. For example, you could reinforce Lexan with steel cable — or even carbon nanotubes; however, you would still need an unrealistic thicknesses of material and it would be very expensive to encircle an entire mile-plus-long track with it.  Economically and practically, this isn’t a reasonable solution.

The “Just Keep the Car on the Ground” Theory

This seems like a very simple approach:  The best way to prevent car-catchfence collisions is to keep the cars from hitting above the SAFER barriers, which means keeping them from leaving the ground.  The new car is designed to decrease the wheel-locking problem that contributes to propeling cars into the air; however, Sicking suggests that the rear wing angle needs to be investigated as another contributor to the problem.

“Angle of attack” refers to the angle between a wing and the oncoming air. In a racecar, the angle of attack determines downforce and drag.  Sicking says that the way the wing is run now – pretty close to flat – provides huge downforce and very little drag.  The problem, he suggests, is that when the car gets a little bit off the ground, the angle of attack of the rear wing actually encourages the car to continue rising.  Increasing the angle decreases downforce and adds drag, which prevents the drivers from running wide open the whole way and discourages the car from lifting. Sicking suggests that increasing the horsepower would also help.

It seems to me there’s a safety issue anytime a driver doesn’t have throttle response. Have you ever been in a rental car trying to enter the expressway (or pass a truck) and you’ve got your foot all the way down on the gas but the car just isn’t going any faster? Not a good feeling.  Throttle response gives a driver additional control and additional control is always a good thing.

The “Pack Mentality” Theory

Cars moving at high speeds give drivers very little time to react. Cars moving in close proximity to each other also decrease the margin of error allowed the driver.

The phrase you hear on the Indycar TV broadcasts is “A football field per second” (which is about 204 mph).  Those of us who aren’t race car drivers may not appreciate how fast that is.  Since most of us don’t have access to a 200-mph car and a track, Sicking sugests heading out to your local high school football field.  Park a car at one end and, when you reach the other end, turn around imagine that (one second later) that car is right on top of you.

When cars are moving together at similar speeds, there isn’t actually much danger because their relative speeds are  very small; however, the minute one car slows down, the relative speed jumps and the drivers have to responds.  From SportsScience to accident reconstruction experts, there is overwhelming evidence that racecar drivers have extremely good reaction times. But even a 99th-percentile reaction time won’t keep you from hitting something if you’re too close to it.

The “We’ll Try Harder and Make Racing Safe so that We Never Lose Another Driver” Theory

Dave Moody touched on this on his Sirius Speedway radio program – he asked whether the Indycar drivers should have been expected to get back in their cars and race after a fatal accident. He suggested that maybe the sport is more humane today and we don’t expect people to ‘buck up’ in the face of tragedy like they did ‘back in the day’.

I have a slightly different take: ‘Back in the day’, more drivers died. People steeled themselves because it was more likely than not that someone would die during a season. Racing has become so much safer, and we’ve had so many fewer accidents that perhaps we have forgotten that this is still inherently dangerous. Getting in a racecar is a calculated risk. When you look back at the old days — tire testing by having drivers run through nails and tacks at high speed — you marvel at the risks drivers willingly accepted.  We’ve minimized many of those risks, and a lot of lives have been saved as a result.  But there is still a risk that what happened on that tragic Sunday at Las Vegas will happen again. I worry that younger drivers – especially those who have never lost a colleague in an on-track incident – feel an unwarrented invincibility (for themselves and others) that leads to less than prudent moves on the track.  But even with everyone on their best behavior,  the motorsports sanctioning bodies could implement every innovation we have and that could still not be enough.

Racing is not 100% safe.  It never will be.

The “We Owe it to Dan” Theory

At the risk of saying this the wrong way, one of the side effects of the reduced number of serious accidents is that we don’t have a lot of data on those types of accidents.  Understanding how to prevent accidents like this requires that we understand the accidents.  Many others have put it more eloquently:  We owe it to Dan — and all the other drivers — to learn from this tragedy and to make changes.   Those changes will not ensure that no driver ever dies on a racetrack, but everything we do will decrease the number of drivers who do make that ultimate sacrifice.

In the second part of this series, I’ll explain how we could do that.

 

UPDATE:  I talked to a number of people this week while trying to resolve this because it was really bugging me not having a consistent answer.  They have some pretty convincing evidence that the angle was indeed significantly shallower than 90 degrees; however, if you run the numbers, I can’t get anything consistent with 100 g and a contact time of 0.008 seconds.  Just goes to show you what a challenge it is to try to figure out what happened without the evidence.  So despite how much it looked like a straight-on hit, it wasn’t.  It’s amazing to me that the camera provides such a distorted picture of reality.  I may never look at a NASCAR race the same way again unless I’m actually there.  So I’m wrong about the angle, but I think (unless I get data otherwise), I’m probably right about the time.  This is exactly why scientists have peer review.

Here’s where I think I got confused:  The attitude of the car (which way it is pointed) can be very different than the motion of the center of mass, especially when a car is sliding instead of rolling.  So even though the car hits head on, the center of mass can be at a shallow angle.

ORIGINAL POST:

While there is a lot of negative press about NASCAR keeping things “secret”, there really are some good reasons for not releasing crash information: One is simply that the data are pregnant with the potential for misuse. As is the case with everything from baseball to K-12 education, people want a single number to measure things against each other, even when it is meaningless to do so.

Sadler’s Pocono crash was really scary.  Thank goodness for the HANS device, the Hendrick carbon-fiber composite seat, and the redesigned car.  The folks at the NASCAR R&D Center – Tom Gideon foremost among them – have all the data (and the car) and will be analyzing it to learn even more about how we keep drivers safe.  Tom was one of the primary voices arguing for safety well, well before four NASCAR deaths in 2000-2001 made the need for action impossible to ignore.  Tom worked for GM Racing when racing safety wasn’t even on most people’s radars.  NASCAR didn’t start requiring black boxes on cars until the early 2000′s, but Tom was very active in advocating for black boxes in race cars in NASCAR and other racing series throughout his entire career.  He and John Melvin (another motorsports safety pioneer) gave a paper on the history of black boxes in motorsports at the last SAE Motorsports Conference.  (Indy cars were recording data as early as 1933!)  Tom is one of the good people in the business.

The biggest concern in a crash is the maximum force felt by the driver.  That force is the product of the driver’s mass times his acceleration.  Acceleration is how fast you change your speed, so we can also write the force in terms of the rate of change of the speed, or in terms of the acceleration. In the equation at right, the triangle v means the change in speed and the triangle t means change in time.  This equation says that if your change in speed is large (Δv large), it hurts. If you stop very quickly (Δt small), it hurts.

People talk about crashes in terms of “gs”. A ‘g’ is the acceleration due to gravity and it has a value of 32.2 feet per second per second, which means that, each second, your speed changes by 32.2 feet per second.  Everyone on Earth is (give or take a little depending on altitude) experiencing 1g of acceleration.  The force the Earth exerts on you is equal to your weight times the number of gs.

Let’s temporarily transport ourselves to another planet, exactly like Earth, but twice as massive. The doubled mass makes gravity twice as strong, so the acceleration due to gravity on this planet would be 2g.  If you weighed 150 lbs on Earth, you’d weigh 2 x 150 lbs = 300 lbs on this new planet.  (Don’t get me into the difference between mass and weight in the English unit system.  This is so much easier in the metric system.)  The ‘g’ is a handy unit:  multiply the weight of the object in pounds times the number of g’s  (unitless) and the product is the force.

Here are a couple caveats about “g” numbers:

1.  The black box is usually placed on the drivers’ side of the car, but it is attached to the car, not to the driver.  The car is designed to absorb the energy of the crash so that it is not transmitted to the driver. The seat is designed to absorb energy from the crash so that it is not transmitted to the driver.  The number from the black box isn’t necessarily an accurate measure of the driver’s experience.  If two cars’ black boxes have the same readings, but the drivers are in different types of seats, or the angles or speeds of the crashes are different, the drivers could experience very different forces.  The number is, however, a number that can be compared to other crashes in which the instrumentation was installed similarly.   NASCAR has a database of every bit of information they can gather from race car crashes and everything they learn during the investigation will be added to what they already know.

2.  You can not assume a spherical NASCAR driver (Make your own jokes here), or a spherical car.  The distance from axle to axle is 110 inches, so different parts of the car could experience very different forces.  The driver’s torso and head move very differently than his arms, for example.  The FIA (Federation Internationale de l’Automobile) is developing accelerometers (meters that measure acceleration) that fit into the radio earpieces drivers already wear.  These incredibly small devices can be less than a few millimeters cubed in volume.  If I were a driver, I’d want access to that technology so that I’d have an actual, real measurement of what happened to me.  Forget the car.  That is much more important than the deceleration of the car.  Something else we’ve learned is that the motion of the internal organs inside the body relative to the body is really important.  The driver may be strapped in securely, but remember that your brain, heart, lungs, stomach, etc. are basically floating around inside your body.  They don’t stop at the same time as the outside of your body.

Jeff Thompson, who’s done some forensic engineering (working backward from the scene of an accident to figure out how the accident happened) did a crash analysis to better understand what exactly happened.  A couple people asked me what I thought about the accident, since their intuition didn’t jibe with Jeff’s results.  Our intuition about the physical world is often wrong, so when I got back into town on Wednesday, I started looking into the situation.  Incidentally, Jeff is part of a great outfit called ten80 education, which has developed a lot of really neat RC car activities for kids of all ages.  They are doing a really neat job using motorsports to get kids (and their parents) interested in racing.  Jeff is also one of the good people in the world in my opinion.

Let”s start by calibrating ourselves with something closer to our own experience.  If you slow from 60 mph to a stop in a tenth of a second, you experience an acceleration of 27.3 gs.  If you weigh 150 lbs, that’s 4,095 lbs.  If you can extend that time to two tenths of a second, you halve the acceleration to 13.6 gs and 2,047 lbs.  The figure of merit  most safety researchers use in a crash is delta v – the change in speed.  That’s proportional to the product of the acceleration times the time.  I’ve written the formula, so all you have to do is pull up Excel, plug in the time of the collision and the number of ‘gs’.  If you do that, you get the graph shown on the right. (If you click on the graph, you can get a larger version of it, which is a little easier to read.  This is true of most of the diagrams in my blogs.)

I’ve drawn three lines representing 80 g, 100 g, and 120 g.  The horizontal axis is the  collision time — the time during which the speed of the car is changing, which is usually the time during which there is contact between the car and the barrier.  If you use 100 gs and a collision time of about 30 milliseconds (three one-hundredths of a second), then the change in speed would only be about 66 mph.  This confused me a little because my perception from watching the video was that Elliott’s crash took place over a relatively long time (as crashes go).  That didn’t seem consistent with Elliott’s reaction, either.  The berm into which he crashed is an earthen mound surrounded by Armco barriers.  The mound is pretty wide, but if you look at the video, you can very clearly see dirt being ejected from the other side.  That’s good because that’s energy absorbed by the barriers.  (If this crash had been into a concrete wall, it would have been an entirely different story.)

Another reason I would argue that the crash was longer is that the car was severely smushed, which means the center of gravity traveled further than it would have if the car bounced right off the barrier.  One of the front wheels was pushed back at least a foot or a foot and a half.  The time it takes for the center of mass of the car to travel 2 feet at 180 mph is 0.016 seconds.  That doesn’t even begin account to account for the time it took to crush the front end of the car and how much that slowed the car down.

We can break the car’s speed into two parts: a part along the wall, and a part perpendicular to the wall, as Jeff did in his analysis.  I’ve shown the part parallel to the wall in blue and the part perpendicular to the wall in red.  The angle at which you hit is important because the change in speed — along and perpendicular to the wall — is proportional to the force felt.

I’ve shown two angles in my drawing. The one on the right is a relatively shallow angle. The blue arrow is large and the red arrow is small. This is good because the force you feel when you hit the wall is (more or less) proportional to the length of the arrow in that direction. You feel a small force when you skim the wall. When you hit it at an angle, the component perpendicular to the wall grows.
It gets slightly more complicated, as I’ve shown in the next figure. The directions change when the car bounces off the wall. If you just look at the part of the motion parallel to the wall, both arrows point in the same direction.  The component of the motion that is perpendicular to the wall changes direction. That means that you actually undergo a much larger change in speed. If you were going 60 mph to the right, and you bounced off a wall so that you were going 60 mph to the left, you’d have a perpendicular speed change of 120 mph.

In most crashes with a barrier, the car continues in the direction it was originally headed and the change in speed in that direction is usually pretty small compared to the perpendicular component.  It isn’t, however, necessarily negligible, especially if the car hits at an angle and the wall creates a torque that causes the car to spin.  The drawing at right doesn’t show much difference between the before and after longitudinal speeds ; however, if the car slowed down a lot during the collision, it is possible that the force parallel to the wall was not negligible.  The angle at which the car hit the wall is incredibly important:  A glancing blow vs. a head-on collision.

Jeff makes a very important point I wouldn’t have thought to consider:  He notes that we have to take into account the orientation of the camera with respect to the  collision.  Have you ever looked at something exactly head-on?  It’s impossible to tell how far away it is.  The lack of perspective, he argues, makes the angle look very different than it is.  I’ve reproduced his sketch from his blog at left  (How I wish I had one-tenth his drawing skill!) His analysis comes up with an impact angle of 18 degrees, a change in perpendicular speed of 56 mph and a collision time of 0.008 seconds.  Those numbers just didn’t “feel right” to me.

Knowing the impact angle precisely is critical.  Calculating the perpendicular speed depends on taking the sine of the impact angle. Sine is a very nonlinear function (well, duh…), so not having an impact angle introduces significant error in the numbers.  The table below shows how the perpendicular speed changes with angle.  A change in angle of three degrees changes the perpendicular speed pretty significantly.  A change of 10 mph in impact speed corresponds to 21g if you assume a collision time of 0.01 seconds, (or 7 g if you assume a collision time of 0.03 seconds).  The sine of 90 degrees is 1, so a head on collision would correspond to a 180-mph perpendicular impact.

Angle(degrees) Perpendicular Speed(mph)
15 46.49
18 55.62
21 64.51
24 73.21
27 81.71

The video sure looks like Elliott hit at a 90-degree angle, but Jeff made his argument well.  Still, the 18-degree number was really bothering me, so I spent some more time looking at the video of the race and perusing Google Earth to try to understand where exactly the accident happened.  The video revealed that Google Earth isn’t necessarily very recent: the picture of the track doesn’t exactly match what the television shows.  In particular,  there are two perpendicular pieces of wall that run from the barrier to the access road that are not shown on Google Earth.  (You can see one of them in the still below).  So the angle of the bend might be different from what I’ve calculated, which is about 167 degrees.

The angle of the barrier isn’t the critical thing: the angle of impact is.  Here, the video gives us some additional information.  First, when the car hit the barrier, it sent dirt flying (the dirt is mounded a little over the Armco.)  Conservation of momentum allows us to use the dirt to tell us something about which way the car hit the barrier

That, in combination with the skid marks coming in, shows that Elliott actually hit the barrier pretty much head on, as shown in the diagram below (pulled from the ESPN coverage during the red flag.)  I think this makes it pretty clear that Elliott’s car was forced into making a hard turn and he hit the barrier nearly perpendicularly. (Thanks to Dr. Bob for watching out of the corner of his eye during the race and insisting that there were clearer pictures of the skid marks.  I was in an airplane during the race.)

You’d really like to slow down the car prior to its hitting anything.   Most large tracks have removed most of their infield grass because the coefficient of friction (especially when the grass is wet) is much lower than it would be on asphalt (even wet asphalt).  A high coefficient of friction (often attained with gravel traps, which aren’t great for the car, but much better than hitting the wall) helps scrub off some of the speed so that you’re not going as fast when you hit.  The explanation I heard is that Pocono is a designated wildlife refuge and that makes it difficult for them to remove grass.

If you were wondering (as I was) how Pocono installs 25 acres of solar cells and can’t pave over infield grass because it’s an environmental refuge, the answer is that the solar forest was put on some existing parking lots.  Major kudos to Pocono for taking this expensive, but important step to green.  More on that in another blog!

Let’s revisit the graph that tells us how speed change and time are correlated.  Here’s an expanded version of my earlier graph.  Let’s assume the worst possible case:  180 mph in and 180 mph out at a 90-degree angle (that’s exaggerated because a lot of energy was transferred to the barrier, but for the sake of worst-case argument…), this would suggest that the time of impact would have been a tenth or two-tenths of a second.  Reviewing the video, that’s not unreasonable.

We can never make racing 100% safe.  Buddy Baker mentioned on his Sirius radio show that the hardest hit he experienced was due to a stuck throttle at Martinsville, a track where speeds are rarely high and the thought of putting SAFER barriers around the inside seems almost silly.  Virtually all types of motorsport have had a reactive attitude toward safety, making changes only after something serious happens.  The sign that this attitude is changing is that the seriousness of the incidents that spawn changes has decreased.  (See Las Vegas and Watkins Glen for example.)  Pocono announced they were going to make changes in the interior barriers after the last race, but there simply wasn’t time to do it before this race.

There is no reason why the highest-speed tracks shouldn’t be required to have SAFER barriers around the entire racing surface, inside and outside.  Yes, it’s very expensive.  In Pocono’s case, there aren’t even existing walls on which to build the barriers, and it is not a coincidence that the fastest tracks are frequently also the longest.  But perhaps NASCAR should set a goal that Elliott’s impact remains the hardest the sport ever sees.

It’s really easy to knock NASCAR.  It’s equally important to praise them when they get stuff right.  Kudos to NASCAR for all they’ve done – requiring the HANS, doing series research into safer seating, and designing the new car – that allowed Elliott to walk away from what could have been a disaster for the sport.  Here’s hoping they continue moving in a proactive manner when it comes to safety.

 

Randy LaJoie Sr.It was quite a surprise getting into the car Tuesday and turning the radio to my favorite Sirius NASCAR show. A very distraught Randy LaJoie was explaining that NASCAR was about to announce that they had suspended him for testing positive for marijuana. The details are widely available, so I won’t repeat them here and, frankly, that’s not the point of this blog. He smoked a joint while partying with a group of people at the racetrack. It was a one-time thing, not something he does regularly but — as Dave Moody pointed out — not a real bright thing to do given NASCAR’s zero tolerance drug policy. Plus, it’s illegal. Randy is jumping through the NASCAR hoops necessary to get reinstated.

I have to say, though, that the admission wasn’t as much of a surprise as the media and fan reaction. It ranged from sort of funny (“@JosephPaulillo: Knew something was up when LaJoie told Coleman during the race, “clear turn 5E, except for the minatour.”) to just plain stupid, the worst of which was a ‘respected’ NASCAR writer tearing apart LaJoie’s apology. How unfair of Randy to have taken all the fun out of kicking people when they’re down by beating everyone to the punch.

I finally reached my limite with the Sirius Speedway caller who actually said, “Don’t worry, Randy will get his life back together and he’ll be fine.”

Give me an effin’ break. Randy doesn’t have anything to “get back together”.

When you reach the point in your life when you really start thinking about what your purpose is on this Earth (which I have recently), you run into a lot of people whom you hope justify their existence by being loving parents, working at homeless shelters and donating to food banks because it is hard to see how what they do in their day jobs makes the world a better place. But my perspective may be skewed because just about everything I’ve seen about the incident focused on LaJoie as a ‘two-time Busch champion’.

I’m not sure where being a racecar driver comes in in terms of making the world a better place. There are some people who have made a point of doing things beyond the track. Over in the ALMS, driver David Brabham spends a lot of his own time and money trying to make the world a better place. Alcohol companies can’t sponsor cars is France, so the Highcroft Patron car at Le Mans instead featured an effort to eradicate malaria – a disease most of us in the U.S. and Europe don’t worry about since it doesn’t affect us. Jeff Gordon, Richard Childress and others have put their own money into medical facilities. This is in contrast to the ‘let me sign this and put it up on ebay and let other people donate money’ approach.

One of the things about being ‘on the inside’ is that you learn things about people that most fans don’t know. Sometimes it’s not a pleasent experience (you find that a driver you really liked is an inconsiderate sexist snob), but sometimes you learn things that you just feel compelled to pass along.

Randy LaJoie is a good racecar driver, but when St. Peter looks down a list of Randy’s accomplishments as he stands at the pearly gates, there’s going to be a long list of names. Those are the names of people whose lives Randy LaJoie has saved.

Randy doesn’t have formal engineering training, but he’s got all the skills of a scientist or engineer. When he was driving (which he refers to as “being my own crash-test dummy”), he realized that it was really important that the driver stopped when the car stopped. Randy’s company, The Joie of Seating, makes seats for race cars.

The Joie of Seating makes seats for NASCAR drivers. Remember Michael McDowell’s crash at Texas? One of Randy’s seats was part of the safety equipment that helped McDowell walk away with nothing more than a few bruises (ribs and ego).

But — and more importantly — Randy makes seats for the everyday racer. The Saturday night men and women who can’t afford carbon fiber, but need a safe, well-fitted seat. They also make seat for kids. The problem with kids is that they outgrow things. Quickly. An entry-level seat for a racecar can cost a couple of hundred to more than a thousand bucks. If you’re not one of those parents into mortgaging the house for your kid’s career, you’re faced with a dilema. Do you buy the seat big so that it will last for two years and try putting some extra padding on so your daughter can’t slide around if she’s hit in her quarter midget?

If you buy a seat from Randy, he’ll trade out seats as your kid grows because he knows a seat is safe only if it fits right. He could make more money by selling more seats, but that’s not really why he’s in business. Randy started a not-for-profit 501(3)c foundation to promote racing safety at short tracks so that all the safety innovations developed for NASCAR’s top series can start being used at the local tracks.

I got to interview Randy for The Science of Speed video series. We spent a whole morning in his shop asking the guys working at the shop if they could please hold off hammering for a just a few more moments and playing with the shop dog.

My favorite part of the interview with Randy was one we used to end of the video segment on safety. He says something like (and I’m paraphrasing – you should really look at the very end of the video if you want to appreciate his passion for safety):

When I was racing, I wanted to reach Victory Lane. Now, when one of my customers calls me on Monday and tells me that they caught on fire, rolled the car, wrecked their… butt*… off, and they’re fine, well, that’s my Victory Lane.

Before anyone throws stones, maybe we should all think a little about what we contribute to the world. We’ve all done stupid things (and I’ve probably done more than my fair share). The difference is that most of us were lucky enough to not be caught. We were allowed to make our mistakes in private.

I’m not arguing that doing good things gives you the right to do bad things, but in the great karmic balance of things, this is not the incident for which Randy La Joie will be remembered. And as proud as I’m sure he is of his racing championships, that’s also not what he is going to be remembered for.

Along with the late Steve Peterson , Dean Sicking and his crew at the University of Nebraska, Gary Nelson, and Tom Gideon (formerly of GM Racing, now with the NASDAR R and D Center), Randy La Joie is one of the people who evangelizes for safety simply because it is the right thing to do, not because they are concerned that losing a popular driver might affect the popularity of a sport and its ability to make money. These are folks who don’t care if you are Jimmie Johnson or a no-name nine-year old in a go kart.

Randy, no one can question your passion and dedication to racing safety. You are one of the people who makes the world a better place – screw ups or no. You became one of my heroes the morning I spent with you in your shop, and you still are.

Footnote: * My favorite part of the morning was when he gave us this great soundbite and we (the crew) were trying to figure out who should ask him if he could do it again exactly the same… without the cuss word!

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